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OPTIONAL TERMS (JUS DISPOSITIVUM) AND
REQUIRED TERMS. (JUS COGENS) IN THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS

Arthur Lenhoff*

I
CIVIL LAw AND CoMMON LAw Vrnws OF THE EFFECTS oF
STATUTORY PROVISIONS

I

N speq.king of statutory law in the common law court-s, lawyers have
ascribed to it a limiting office, namely, that of interference with the
parties' freedom to act and transact at their pleasure. A closer consideration shows them that the function of statutory law varies not
only with the legal system to which it belongs, but also with the structural changes within a single legal system.

A. The Theory of the Civil Law Codes
Whereas in the civil law countries all of the law is conclusively
presumed to be comprised in codes,1- it is simply not possible to regard
each and every statutory provision as preclusive of the freedom of the
parties -to contract otherwise, since a codification claiming inclusiveness
must necessarily contain (and this on a large scale) provisions subject
in their application to the choice of the contracting parties. Only in
the: absence of such a choice the provisions will apply. Terms of this
class .are, for example, in the law of sales, those which refer to the
time and the place of delivery, the cost and risk of transportation, and
the passage of title.
Rules of law of this kind are called "jus dispositivum." 2 Since

*

Professor of Law, University of Buffalo Law School; member of the New York
Bar; author, "The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal
System," g9 MxcH. L. REv. 1109 (1941).
1
For this reason civil law codifications have to refer (expressly or interpretatively)
to analogy as the method for deciding a case for which no rule of decision can be found.
E.g., Austrian Code Civil (1811) § 7; Swiss Code Civil (1907) art. I. For the common law method, by which the judge has the power to see to it that, despite the lack
of any precedents, ibi remedium ubi jus, as he creates that jus, see Dailey v. Parker,
(C.C.A. 7th, 1945) 152 F. (2d) 174.
2
STAMMLER, LEHRBUCH DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE, 2d ed., 292 (1923). There
are two concepts of jus dispositivum, one of which points to the stopgap rules while the
other signifies the leges quae disponunt tantum, non cogunt. Buelow, "Dispositives Zivilprozessrecht und die Verbindliche Kraft der Rechtsordnung," 64 ARcHIV FUR DIE
CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 1, 71 -73 ( 188 1) .
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their effect is inferior to that of terms which the parties themselves put
into their transactions, they may, but need not, be disregarded by the
actors and contractors. Wherever the will of the parties determined
, the contents of the transaction, as was the case with contracts, there
existed in the civil law countries only very few statutory provisions
which were not of the "jus dispositivu'm" category. The sporadic terms
prescribed. by -statutes-terms, therefore, of a bargain-proof character
-have been called "ju,s cogens." 8 The name signifies a meaning op.posite to that of "jus dispositivum."
Thus, on principle, it can be stated that in the field of contracts the
terms chosen by the parties prevailed over the statutory terms. However, in the course of the last half century the proportion which flexible statutory rules bore to the rigid ones changed somewhat in favor
of ,the latter. Obviously, this• process evolved with the gradual advancement of an economic order of regulations or planning which tends
to displace that of voluntarism and freedom.
The predominance of flexible rules of law was consistent with the
economic philosophy as well as with the legal theory which underlay
the great civil law codifications,4 or, to put it in a little different •language, with individual bargaining on the one hand and conclusively
presumed inclusiveness of the codes on the other.
1
What can make clearer their legal theory, that the party-made
terms, the "lex !ontractus," are to be equated to the statutory terms,
the lex proper, than the provision of the Code Napoleon, as follows?
"Les conventions legalement formees tiennent lieu de loi a ceux
qui les ont faites." 5
8

1 W1NscHEID, LEHRBUcH DES PANDEKTENRECHTs 125 (1906), and 3 id. 797
(index, "jus cogens") (1906); EUGEN EHRLICH, DAs ZwINGENDE UND N1cHTZWINGENDE RECHT IM B.G.B. (1899). The Romans included jtes cogens within the
concept of jus publicum quod pactis prioatorum mutari non potest. D. II. 14: 38. Cf.
in Freeman's Appeal, 68 Conn. 533, 37 A.,420 (1897).
4
For the historical reasons which created the desire for total codification on the
,, continent, see MuNROE SMITH, A GENERAL Vrnw OF EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY
AND OTHER PAPERS (1927).
5
French Code Civil ( 1804), art. II 34( I); Italian Codice Civile ( I 86 5) § II 23;
Swiss, Law of Obligations, art. 19; the French speak of the "oolonte des particulier.s"
as the "souveraine mattres.se" over the consensual relations between the parties. I DEMOGUE, TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL, no. 27 et seq. (Paris 1923). The German jurists mean the same thing by referring to the "Vertragsautonomie:'' I TuHR, DER
ALLGEMEINE TE1L -DES DEuTScHEN BuRGL1cHEN REcHTs 25 (1914); Stoll,
"Bertragsfreih'eit,'' 3 N1PPERDEY, Drn GRUNDRECHTE UND GRUNDPFLICHTEN IN.
DER. REICHSVERFASSUNG 178 (1930).
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B. The Theory of the Common Law
In the common law countries an entirely different theory of statutory law has developed. It is significant that here the terms "jus
cogens" and "jus dispositivum" have remained totally unknown. 6 This
is apparent if one keeps in mind that until recently statutory law has
been given a somewhat minor place so that a codification even of a
single branch of law was not enacted until the middle of the Nineteenth
Century. Until then a legislative act constituted, and was considered,
an exception imposed to remove mischiefs and evils which now and
then the natural growth of the common law had failed to remedy.
Thus one may subscribe to the correctness of the succinct metaphor
that statutes must be regarded only as the "addenda and errata' of the
book of the common law." 7
As a result of this "rationale," statute law has exhibited the most
rigorous, unrelenting and unyielding character of rules. Why, we may
ask? To be sure, there were none of another nature. The spirit in
which the ancient English jurists ·approached the construction of a
statutory provision can be seen best by Lord Hobart's comparison:
"The statute is like a tyrant; where he comes he makes all void." 8
Certainly no legal system can do without optional rules. In the view
of the common law of England and America, ho.wever, they were
bound to hide their character behind the shape ..of "implied" promises
because the parties' will and nothing else was deemed to control the
bargain. A policy which considered anything other than the expres~ed
intention of the parties to be impotent to produce contractual obligations necessarily conflicted with the needs of an economic system for
which individual transactions became the exclusive mechanism.
It is obvious that the strictest adherence to the common law principle, that the parties should be bound only as to what they expressly
intended to be bound by, would have rendered most transactions ineffective; the more intricate a transaction, the greater the probability
that there are some matters left unsettled because the paorties did not
6

The distinction is briefly mentioned in FREUND, LEGISLATIVE REGULATION 7,
I 72 ( I 93 2). He called the two classes "absolute'~ and "yielding" law. The word
"absolute" conveys multifarious concepts, one of which may coincide with that of the
text. This author prefers the expressions "required" and "optional," suggested by my
colleague, Professor Louis L. Jaffe.
'1 GELDART, ELEMENTS OF ENGLISH LAW 9 (1914).
8
Quoted in Maleverer v. Redshaw, [K.B. 1669] I Mod. 35, 86 Eng. Rep. 712.
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anticipate them. Shall the courts then, destroy the whole bargain? Recently the English House of Lords took the view even if expressed
only in the form of dicta that the courts were willing to imply terms
whenever the parties thought that they had made a binding contract.°
Such a view may explain the invention of the concept called "open
contracts," so named because, aside from the designation of the parties
and the property to be sold and of the purchase price, all other terms
remained open and were to be "implied." 10 Terms implied in this way
include those of time and place of the payment, the interest rate, the
time of the maturity of a purchase money mortgage, the assignability
of the contract and the allocation of the risk of loss. 11
In contrast to the Roman law and the civil law, the common law,
perceiving contractual obligations exclusively in terms pointing to the
intention of the parties, lived up verily to that principle by the complete abstention from any prescription as to the contents of the contract.
One may compare therewith the detailed classification of contracts in
the other legal systems, a classification based upon the difference between their contents.12
,
In other legal systems the content of a contract does not lose itscontractual character where the terms are prescribed by the codes. In
the common law countries a contrary approach is found; this will be
discussed at length in section three.
In order to save incomplete transactions, according to the intention
test, the common law courts resorted, as we saw, to the construction of
an "implied," that is, a fictitious intention. Theythus assumed that the
parties silently "intended" to be bound by all the terms and condi~ Lord Maugham in Scammell and Nephew, Ltd. v. Ouston, (1941] A.C. 251.
(The existence of a contract under the particular circumstances, however, was denied
because of the lack of that reasonable degree of certainty required for the "consensUJ
ad idem.")
10
I WILLIAMS, VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 3d ed., 16 (1922).
11
E.g~, DeWolf v. Johnson, IO Wheat. (10 U.S.) 367 at 383 (1825); Page v.
Cook, 164 Mass. 116, 41 N.E. 115 (1895); Calkins v. Chandler, 36 Mich. 320
(1877); Wertheimer v. Boehm, 241 N.Y. 575, 150 ~.E. 561 (1925); Weyand v.
Park Terrace Co., 202 N.Y. 231, 95 N.E. 723 (1911); Roberge v. Winne, 144 N.Y.
709, 39 N.E. 631 (1895); Weintraub v. Kruse, 234 N.Y. 575, 138 N.E. 452
(1922); Strong v. Sheffield, 144 N.Y. 392, 39 N.E. 330 (1895); Sanders v. Pottlitzer Bros. Fruit Co., 144 N.Y. 209, 39 N.E. 75 (1894); Pollak v. Dapper, 219 AP.I?·
Div. 455, 220 N.Y.S. 104 (1927), affirmed, 245 N.Y. 628, 157 N.E. 886 (1927);
Roberts v. Hoberg, 212 App. Div. 595, 209 N.YS. 437 (1925); Clark v. Richardson,
222 Ind. 4, 51 N.E. (2d) 484 (1943).,
12 2 WINSCHEID, LEHRllUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS, §§ 319, 363 (1906).
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tions not expressed in the bargain, but which were customary or usual
in the type of business.18
Naturally, at present it is generally recognized that behind all those
implications lie not presumptions of a factual consent; but rules of law
as developed in case-by-case ma,de law. The .operation of such rules of
law can be excluded by the parties; the parties may vary them as they
please. But if they do not, the rules irretrievably control the transaction. Parol evidence will not be admitted to contradiet or to vary the
"implied" terms. 14 Furthermore, it is for the judge, not the jury, to
deal with the "implied" terms and conditions of which the parties
themselves have not necessarily really taken notice, but of which the
courts assuredly must take judicial notice.15

II
OPTIONAL TERMS

It is not generally recognized to what extent the rules of both
common law and statute law are subject to modifications. It is important first to recognize the existence of this situation, and then to form
a correct notion of the relation of optional statutory terms to the,
transaction.
A. The Choice-of-Law Problem
The question whether regulatory terms and conditions· are of the
:flexible or inflexible class is subject to juristic interpretation. Nowhere
more than in the conflict of laws field is the distinction clearer. One
can see from the British-Canadian case, Vita-Food Products v. Unus
Shipping Company, Ltd., how much the answer to that question
changes with varying construction in the different jurisdictions.16 The
18

For implied terms and for the translation of usages into agreement and of
agreement into statutory language, see the illuminative discussion in CHESHIRE AND
FIFOOT, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 93 (1945).
14
E.g., Tobias v. Lynch, 192 App. Div. 54, 182 N.Y.S. 643 (1920), affirmed,
233 N.Y. 515, 135 N.E. 898 (1922). Cf. I CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 207
(1932) and, following it, Seaman v. DeNoyelle, 269 App. Div. 945, 58 N.Y.S. (2d)
527 (1945).
15
Costigan, "Implied-in-Fact Contracts and Mutual Assent," 33 HARV. L. REV.
376 (1920).
16
Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Company, Ltd., [1939] A. C. 277,
noted, 40 CoL. L. REv. 518 (1940). The contract of carriage concerning goods to be
shipped from Newfoundland to New York was entered into in Newfoundland; as a
result of the ship having run ashore in Nova Scotia through the negligence of the
captain, the plaintiff-consignees received the shipment, consisting of herrings, in a
damaged condition. Their action for damages against the shipowners was dismissed by
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case turned upon a Newfoundland act that every bill of lading should
contain an express statement referring to the subordination of the
contract to the so-called Hague Rules.
The highest court found that this requirement was not obligatory,
but only directory,11 and thus was immaterial. That interpretation led
the court to the conclusion that the limitation of liability clauses in the
bill (which were the same as the Hague Rules) controlled.18 The court
fortified its conclu~ion by reliance on an express choice by the parties
of the English law which would have decided the interpretation question in this way.19 ·The weak link in this chain of reasoning remains,
of course, the question whether the stipulation concerning English law
was strong enough to bring all problems, including that of validity,
within the domain of English law.
, As will b1e seen later, statutory rules which go· to the contents of a
contract must be distinguished from those which are essential to its
formation. As for the latter, the selection-of-law stipulation cannot
constitute the last word on its validity. A stipulation in a contract cannot claim validity if the contract itself must be considered invalid. Is it
not true that "an agreement is not a contract except as the law says it
shall be and to try to make it one is to pull on one's bootstraps"? 20
Consequently, before an agreement referring to a certain legal system,
for instance, English law, as··the law which th~ parties want to be applied to the transaction, obt~ins the quality of a contract, it must
the courts in Nova Scotia. A further appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Councµ likewise failed.
17
Being suggested by the LL.A. on its thirtieth meeting in 1921, at The Hague,
the Rules were adopted by the International Conferences on Maritime Law at Brussels,
1922 and 1923, whereupon the legislature of many countries enacted them as national
laws. For the United States enactment see 49 Stat. L. 1208, 46 U.S.C. (1940)
§ 1300 et seq. According to the Rules, damage resulting from the negligence of the
master in the navigation is exer.o.pted from the liability of the owner.
18 The bill of lading in the' instant case contained substantially the same restric•
tions with regard to the liability of the owner as the Rules. Since even without that
substantial complianc~ with the Rules, the application of the latter necessarily had to
result in the defense of non-liability, the plaintiff could have won only upon the
grounds that the omission in the charter of a reference to the Rules made the bill of
lading entirely ineffective, so that the defendants were to be liable upon common law
principles alone.
·
19 For the question whether in the instant case the defendants could escape the
application of Newfoundland law by. selection of the English law, see Coox, THE
LoGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 419 (1942).
20
Learned Hand, J., in Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1931) +8
F. (2d) II5. The same idea was previously formulated by Langdell, "A Brief Survey
of Equity iurisdiction," 1 HARv. L. REV. 55 at 56, note l (1887).

CoNTRACTS

45

measure up to what the lex causae requires for the making of a contract. 21
The legal system which independently from the will of the parties
will determine the quality of the agreement as a contract is the lex
causae. Ergo, in order to become a contract, the agreement must conform to the requirements of the lex causae. As we saw, not all its rules,
however, demand unconditional compliance. How far, therefore, the
contracting parties must be deemed at freedom to subject the bargain,
for instance, to English law, 22 will depend upon the rules of the lex
causae with respect to such freedom. 28 Assuming that the law authorized the exercise, the rules of the law so chosen will determine the
.contents of the bargain. That means that the chosen law will have
control, for example, over the interest rates,24 the time limitations, and
21
The Unus decision by a court of last resort greatly weakened its persuasiveness
by its loose phraseology, using the concept of invalidity of the transaction in one place
in the sense of signifying the absence of any contractual effect. In the preceding paragraph, however, the word is given the meaning of unenforceability merely in the
forum. At first sight the court seems to suggest that parties by the choice of a foreign
law may contract themselves out of the lex causae. The result reached by the court
may be sustained only upon the distinction, pointed out in this paper, between requirements for the validity of a transaction and conditions and terms stipulated for by reference to a foreign law.
22
According to Liverpool & G.W. Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397
at 453, 9 S. Ct. 469 (1889), the law of the place of contracting applies".•. unless the
contracting parties clearly appear to have had some other law in view." Cf. Scudder v;
Union Nat. Bank, 91 U.S: 406 (1875). That this proviso does not give the parties
the power to contract themselves out of the lex causae can be seen from the following
note.
28
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 24 S. Ct. 538 (1904) (insurance
contract made in State of Washington, containing a clause that it shall be held and
construed at all times and places to have been made in New York). Said the Supreme
Court: " ••• parties contracting outside of the State of New York may, by agreement,
incorporate into the contract the laws of that State and make its provisions controlling
upon both parties, provided such provisions do not conflict with tke I~ or public
policy of the State in wkich the contract is made." Id. at 554. (Italics supplied.). As
for conflict-of-law rules of foreign countries, which, :is those of Austria, Brazil, D~n- ·
mark, Italy, Norway, Peru and Poland, greatly limit the freedom of choice, see

DIE
§ 38~ (1932).

MELCHIOR,

GRUNDLAGEN DES DEUTSCHEN INTERNATIONALEN PRJ_VATRECHTS,

u Bundy v. Comm. Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 157 S.E. 860 (1931) (reference to Delaware law was held ineffective in a contract made in Maryland by plain.tiff,
a North Carolina corporation, with defendant, a pelaware Corporation where defend- .
ant's business was wholly outside the state of Delaware). Seeman v. Phila. Warehouse
Co., 274 U.S. 403, 47 S. Ct. 626 (1927): "The [New York] loan contract
[even if made in New York] which stipulated for repayment ••• (in Pennsylvania)
and which thus chose that law as governing its validity, cannot be condemned as an
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the r~strictions upon liability, the question of the exclusion of warranties and of the significance to be placed upon restrictive labor covenants 25 and other terms and conditions formulated by law. The choice,
of course, may be expressed or may be implied from the whole transaction's showing clearly the intention of resorting to a foreign law. 26
The reference to foreign currency supplies an illustration of the proposition.
'
In any event,,from what has been previously stated, it follows
that the rules of the lex causae prevail as far a;s its prescribed terms and
conditions are in conflict with those of the law which was merely chosen
by the parties, though the lex causae may itself restrict the application
of the required terms to transactions not involving foreign elements.
But even if such is the case, still the application of the chosen foreign
law_ may encounter some obstacles, where the foreign elements have
been inserted in order to escape the lex causae (fraude a la loi). 21
Undoubtedly, the frequent refusal of die courts to let stipulations
freely made operate according to the parties' desires often rests upon
the absence of any real contact of the bargain with the law stipulated
for. An obligation, if imposed upon a contractor by an inflexible rule,
does not cease to affect the contract merely because the contractor
sought to circumvent by the means of a foreign-law stipulation.28
Once granted the power of the parties to·exclude substantial terms
of the lex causae, it is clear that it is immate,rial whether the parties
painfully draft one stipulation after another, or instead adopt the body
of the foreign law as they did in the Unus case. The point was expressly
recognized 9y a California court. The court held that California law
controlled a marine insurance contract, but that nevertheless the parties
evasion of the law of New York which might otherwise be deemed applicable." (Italics
supplied.)
25
Holland Furnace Co. v. Connolley, (D.C. Mo. 1943) 48 F. Supp. 543 (Michiga,n employment contract, to be performed in Missouri, containing restrictive covenant,
invalid under Michigan law, but good by Missouri law).
26
The selection of provisions of another legal system may be made impliedly. See,
e.g., the Seeman case, 274 U.S. 473, 47 S. Ct. 626 (1927), and Louis-Dreyfus v.
Paterson Steamship, Ltd., (C.C.A. 2d, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 824.
21
See reasoning in Andrews v. Pond, 13 Pet. (38 U.S.) 65 (1839), and Brierley
'V. Comm. Credit Co., (D:C. Pa. 1929) 43 F. (2d) 724, affirmed, (C.C.A. 3d, 1930)
43 F. (2d) 730.
28
Ocean Steamship Co., Ltd. v. Queensland State Wheat Board, (1941] l K.B.
402 (very well advised, the draftsman of the Australian contract which referred to
English law, inserted a clause which excluded those provisions of the latter law from
being applied to the contract, which appeared to be inconsistent with the Australian
carriage of goods by sea act).
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were entitled to stipulate for the application of English law because
California law allowed the parties so to contract. 20 In other words,
this particular law of California (incidentally, statutory law) was construed so as to fall within the class of jus dispositivum only.
Certainly, within the indicated limitations, if the oft repeated phrase
that the intention of the parties controls the contents of the contract
is true, nothing seems to be wrong with the choice of a foreign law;
for instead of copying word for word from the foreign law, the parties
can simplify the procedure by referring to a foreign law as such.80
The significance of the foregoing analysis is manifest also for
another reason. The law chosen by the parties supplies the terms
for matters which the parties left unsettled. As it was stated in the
Ututs case, the chosen law (provided the choice was allowed by th~ lex
causae) "does indeed fix the interpretation and construction of the
express terms and supply the relevant background of statutory or
implied terms." 81
The issues in actions involving such conflict problems may concern
the classification as well as the scope of principles, precepts, and rules
of the controlling law. Are the rules, as in that California case, only
optional? 82 Is their scope to be limited to strictly domestic bargains? ss
29

Boole v. Union Marine Ins. Co., 52 Cal. App. 207, 198 P. 416 (1921).
Cook, "'Contracts' and the Conflict of Laws: 'Intention' of the Parties," 32
ILL. L. REV. 899 at 906 (1937), included in CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 399 (1942).
81
Vita Food Products Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., Ltd., [1939] A.C. 277 at 291
(italics supplied). '
82
Where the incident to the contract, e.g., the operation of the parol evidence
rule, might be considered as "waivable" {the •rule being, according to the lex causae,.
of substantive character), the forum might not apply the rule. Zell v. American Seating
Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 641. It might be that the rule of substantive law
is "waivable" only upon the compliance with certain requirements. Illinois Steel Co. v.
B. & 0. R.R. Co., 320 U.S. 508, 64 S. Ct. 322 (1944) [Only by incorporating a nonrecourse clause into a uniform bill of lading does the consignor obtain relief from liability for the payment of the freight charges; even though delivery by the carrier to the
consignee should be made without receiving payment]. That the consignor would
otherwise remain_ liable to the carrier irrespective of a stipulation to the contrary can
be seen from Boston and Me. R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97, 34 S. Ct. 526 (1914).
Equally, the validity of clauses limiting the liability of a carrier in a contract referring
to foreign law as the applicable one may depend on the classification of the rule in the
lex cousae. If there it is regarded as jus cogens, a contrary stipulation will be devoid
of any effect. Oceanic Steamship Navigation Co. v. Corcoran, (C.C.A. 2d, 1925)
9 F. (2d) 724.
38
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 193 U.S. 551, 24 S. Ct. 538 (1904) (express
reference to New York law in a contract made in Washington). See Chitty, J. in In
re Missouri Steamship, 42 Ch. Div. 321 (1889), on the scope of the pertinent rule
so
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Will not a qualification of the transaction different from that in the lex
loci contractus result in the applicatio~ of other rules than the one
applied there to the bargain? 84 Generally the courts of the forum will
follow the lead of the lex causae as far as the question whether a legal
precept is waivable or non-waivable is at issue; but their own characterization of the transaction will determine under which precepts it
will be subsumed.85 Correctly, the forum will also look to the courts
of the lex loci contractus respecting their construction of a rule having
a strictly domestic scope.86 The forum, however, can decide those questions for itself. It can certainly do so where the law of a foreign country is involved; but it may even disregard the construction chosen by
the courts of the sister state if it finds-its own classification preferable.87
Natur:illy, terms properly chosen by the parties but in conflict with
in the proper law. Cf. N.Y. Ins. L. (McKinney, 1940) § 143(2) excluding the freedom of choice where either the persons insured are New York residents or the situs
of the property is in New York or the activities insured against liability risks are carried out in New York.
84
Reasoning in McArthur v. Maryland Casualty Co., 184 Miss. 663, 186 S.
305 (1939); cf. Wood & Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, (C.C.A. 2d,
1930) 43 F. (2d) 941.
85
E.g., Brooks-v. Traveler's Protective Assn., (D.C. N.Y. 1931) 47 F. (2d)
618. There the law of Pennsylvaµia allowing a clause shortening the time of limitation was applied to a membership certificate in a fraternal benefit association organized
in Missouri, upon the ground that the place of contracting was in Pennsylvania.
Naturally, the con~truction of a contract in which the parties subjected themselves
to a certain law, e.g., Spanish law, may show that according to the entire meaning
, of the bargain only the rules of the foreign substantive law were to be applied. Dorff
v. Taya, 194 App. Div. 278, 185 N.Y.S. 174 (1920), noted, 34 HARV. L. REv.
784 (1921).
116
See, for instance, as respects the question of the requisite of consideration; In
re Bonacina, Le Brasseur v. Bonacina, [1912] 2 Ch. 3941 (promise made by an Italian
in Italy to an Italian 'credito.r subsequent to his release from provable debts held valid
despite absence of consideration).
87
·
Thus, statutory exemption rights, the waiver of which was invalid under this
law (the lex cdusae) were disregarded in the, forum (Illinois). Sanders v. Armour
Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 54 S. Ct. 677 (1934). The Full Faith and Credit
Clause may compel the application of the construction of a statute, as well as of a
charter and of by-laws, placed upon them by the,courts of the state of incorporation,
when the classification thereof as substantive is accepted. As for statutes, see Bradford
Eiectric Light Co., Inc. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571 (1932). As for bylaws, see Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531, 35 S. Ct. 724 (1915); Modern
}Voodm7n v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544, 45 S. Ct; 389 (1925); Sovereign Camp of' the
Woodmen of the World v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66, 59 S. Ct. 35 (1938). So far there
has not been a direct pronouncement by the United States Supr_eme Court upon constitutional ·guaranties for the enforcement of a sister state's common law rules. See Ross,
"Has the Conflict of Law become a Branch of Constitutional Law?" 15 MrnN. L. REV.
161 at 172 (1931).
·
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considerations of strong local policy, will in all probability be disregarded in the forum. The recourse to public policy as the ground for
the refusal to enforce the terms, properly called the public policy
exception, has the effect that terms recognized as valid at the place of
contracting appear to be ineffective under the law of the forum:8 8 In
this connection, a recent New. York case, Roth v. Patino,89 calls for
brief comment. Th~re, the prerequisites for the form of the transaGtion
were met according to the lex loci, French law, but not according to
New York law. Assuming with the court that the parties had impliedly
chosen New York law as the applicable body of law, could one approve.
of the decision which the court placed upon the ground that the choice
of a law included the subjection of the transaction to all requirements
of the foreign law,.not only to the terms concerning the contents of the
1:!ansaction involved? Since French law determined whether the transacti~n was a tontract, the "chosen" New York law could effect only
matters of contents, not those of validity.
At this point it may be worth while to pause and consider the consequences which result from denial of the enforcement of such stipulations. Fox v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. involved the problem.40
The defendant company was sued for damages caused by a delay in
the delivery of a telegram; it pleaded a stipulation valid at the place of
contracting which was New Yark, and valid at the place of delivery
which was Illinois. Nevertheless, the forum, a Wisconsin court, refused
to follow either law and held the company liable according to its own
law. In criticizing the decision, a learned writer remarked that what
the court did was to enforce a contract which was never made. 41 No
doubt, if made on the con_tine:qt such a criticism would sound quite
familiar, the civilian thinking that obligations, although imposed upon
the parties by law, assume the character of contractual obligations .
rather than tortious· ones, because they are incidents to the contract.42
Certainly, in the Fox case, the traditional common law concept of
the liability of a carrier as sounding in tort formed the basis of the decision.48 Under this view, an exculpatory clause was regarded as a
88 Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 61 S. Ct. 807 (1941).
39

185 Misc. 325, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 853 (1945).
138 Wis. 648, 120 N.W. 399 (1909)".
n Ross, "Has the Conflict of Law become a Branch of Constitutional Law?" l 5
M1NN. L. REv. 161 at 162 (1931).
42
See, e.g., S.K. v. Kn., 77 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts (Zi~.) 408
(l9II).
I
48
138 Wis. 648 at 651, 120 N.W. 399 (1909) ("••. the tort was committed••••") (Italics supplied).
40
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stipulation aimed at the creation of an immunity for the common carrier from his legal liability. If this view was correct, the court might
properly have refused to apply the stipulation because of its incompatiblity with the local policy of the forum. 44
It is questionable, however, whether a court should invoke the
public policy reservation in a case which has no contact with the forum.
Ordinarily, in such cases American courts follow a hands-off policy
~egarding the propriety of foreign law.45
·

B. Procedural Codes
The classification of statutory provisions as discussed previously
is not restricted to substantive law. By no means can it be said that all
of codified procedural law subjects the parties absolutely to its control.
Far from that, the codes of recent vintage le~ve the parties the greatest
latitude in shaping the course of an action, a latitude which they hadenjoyed in the pre-Code era. For instance, in a civil action the parties
may choose not only venue,4 6 but may by stipulation extend the time
for appeal and the time for pleading; the latter with some restrictions.
Moreover, the parties are able conventionally to shorten the time statutorily limited for the commencement of an action. 47 They may like44 E.g., Santa Fe, P. & P. R.R. Co. v. Grant Bros. Construction Co., 228 U.S,.
177, 33 S. Ct. 474 (1913); The Kensington, 183 US. 263, 22 S. Ct. 102 (1902);
Strauss & Co. v. Can. Pac. Ry. Co., 254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930). Where the
code of a foreign country declared its provisions to be not subject to a waiver and the
lex fori has no analogous provisions, the court may dismiss the action. This was done
because of such divergence respecting damages for wrongful death in Slater v. Mexican
Nat. Ry. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 24 S. Ct. 581 (1904).
45 Another question not subject of the present discussion is presented by the
narrow interpretation given the Full Faith and Credit clause which was thus held (in
line with the general attitude of the courts) not to cover the common law of the sister
states.
46 Whether the application of one of the altern~te venue provisions .of..the federal
Employers Liability Act, §6 [45 U.S.C. (1940) § 56], can be contracted away is a
disputed question. See on the one hand Detwiler v. Lowden, 198 Minn. 185, 269
N.W. 367, 838 (1936), on the other, Sherman v. Pere Marquette Ry., (D.C. Ill.
1945) 62 F. Supp. 590. As for stipulations for .venue in tax cases see I.R.C., § l 141

(b) (2).
47

-

The only restriction placed upon such agreements is that of reasonableness of
the length of time. Sapinkopf v. Cunard S.S. Co., 254 N.Y. 111, 172 N.E. 259
(1930), cert. den., 282 U.S. 879, 51 S. Ct. 83 (1930) (bill of lading); Brandyce v.
Globe.& R. Fire Ins. Co., 252 N.Y. 69, 168 N.E. 832 (1929) (insurance policy);
as a result of such stipulation, the limitation statute does not apply at all, including its
provisions which would otherwise have entitled the plaintiff, who was involuntarily
nonsuited, to renew his action within one year. Kenemer v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co.,
(C.C.A. 5th, 1945) 151 F. (2d) 567.
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wise elect the trier of the c.ase, jury or judge, or referee; as for the
latter, they may select even the person.
Thus the centuries-old custom which let the parties control the
mechanism of proceedings has wound its way into the structure of
modern codes.
Now and then the courts feel obligated to remind the parties of a
few limitations which they think are placed upon the power of the
parties to an action. Such was the case, recently, in Skinner v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 48 There the parties sought to force upon the
appellate tribunal their agreement that an order denying plaintiff's
motion for a temporary injunction be considered and treated for all
purposes as a decision made after trial and that the appeal from the
order be treated as an appeal from a judgment rendered on the
merits after trial. Incidentally, the temporary injunction was not denied upon the ground that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, but, on
the contrary, upon the ground that nothing less than a trial could remove the strong doubts whether the plaintiffs had a cause of action.49
True, the New York Court of Appeals felt bound to reverse the Appellate Division which had gone so far as to concede the parties the power
to have a review on the merits without a judgment. However, Chief
Judge Lehman, who delivered the opinion, .added a dictum that
"· .. Subject only to limitations imposed by the law of the State, they
[ the parties] could by stipulation agree upon the rules of substantive
law and procedure that should be applied in determining the controversy by a court of competent jurisdiction." 50
Although it might still be true that the parties cannot completely
deprive a court of its jurisdiction over a c.ase, one can discern in the
expansion of legislation enforcing the performance of arbitration clauses
and agreements and in other matters a trend to the contrary. 51
48

294 N.Y. 474, 63 N.E. (2d) 64 (1945).
N.Y. Civil Practice Act (Cahill, 1937) § 584 (2) " ..• may grant the motion
for judgment which the court below ought to have granted."
50
294 N.Y. 474 at 478, 63 N.E. (2d) 64 (1945) (italics supplied); as for the
rules of evidence, for centuries agreements to alter them were held admissible, e.g.,
Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Gray (72 Mass.) 174 (1856); cf. l WrcMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 7a at p. 217 (1940). As for a waiver of the parol evidence rule, see
Brady v. Nally, 151 N.Y. 258, 45 N.E. 547 (1896); Loomis v. New York Cent. &
H.R.R. Co., 203 N.Y. 359, 96 N.E. 748 (19II)
51
Cf. 2 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, §558 (1932). Reference may be had to the
abundance of concurrent jurisdiction and to the choice left to the parties for the
removal to federal courts. Stipulations restrictive of venue provisions -of the Federal
Employers Liability Act were held valid in Detwiler v. Lowden, 198 Minn. 185, 269
N.W. 367, 838 (1936), and held invalid in Sherman v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co.,
49
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Finally, in contrast to the civil law codifications, neither the codes
of civil procedure nor other statutes regulating a more or less extended
branch of law operate upon the assumption of being "the," not merely
"one" source of the law concerned. In other words, all ,=he statutes
rest upon the admission that there are gaps; they disclaim Luecken- •
losigkeit, thus leaving the more or less large vacuum to the rules and
precepts of the unwritten law.52

C. Optional Terms in Statutes
In section 7r of the Uniform Sales Act/ 8 derived from section 55
of the ~nglish Sale of Goods Act,54 the parties to the contract are given
the right to negative or vary what would arise as right, duty, or liability by implication of law. Expressum facit cessare tacitum. 55 Thus
the connotation of legal terms as implied ones constitutes the basis for
their classification as jus dispositivum.
In contrast to them, the obligations framed as statutory commands
must be construed as being unsusceptible of variations or alterations by
stipulations of the parties. The so-called "implied" warranties pi;-esent
a good example of terms that arise, as it was said in a recent case, outside of the contract; yet the law, said the court, annexes them to the
contract.56 It writes them, by implication, into the contract which the
(D.C. Ill. 1945) 62 F. Supp. 590. Likewise by resort to the waiver concept one has
arrived at the suability of an unincorporated labor union. .Iron Molders' Union v.
Allis-Chalmers Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1908) 166 F. 45. As for stipulations for removal
from courts of general jurisdiction to a Surrogate Court even in excess of .the statutory direction,' see Matter of Buehler, 186 Misc. 306 (1946). However, see, against
the admissibility of the waiver of a trial where the facts were in dispute, Jacobs v.
1
Steinbrick, 242 App. Div. 197, 273 N.Y.S. 498 (1934).
.
G2 E.g., Matter of Barnes, ~85 Misc. 215, 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 386 (1945), holding
that the New York Civil Practice Act does not provide for an adjudication of competency on application brought after the adjudication had become res judicata on the
question whether petit~oner was incompetent. Ergo, said the court, the proceeding
must still.be controlled by the common law (i.e., in the nature- of supersedeas) giving
the court full discretion on the issue even though petitioner was released from State
Hospital as being in a normal state. Cf. the reference of the Uniform Negotiable
Instrument Law, § 196, to1the law merchant and the reference of the Uniform Sales
Act, § 73, to the rules of law and equity including the law merchant as to any case not
provided for in those acts. The exception is presented for obvious constitutional reasons
in the penal Codes, e.g. N.Y. Penal Law (McKinney, 1944) § 22.
58 Apwoved in 1906 by the National CoI?-ference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws and adopted by 3 5 states.
54
56 and 57 Viet., c. 71 (1894).
·
55
2 Co. Litt. Hargrave and Butler, 19th ed., *183 (1832).
56
Bekkevold v. Potts, 173 Minn. 87, 216 N.W. 790 (1927) .

.
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parties have made. Consequently, on the one hand the parties may
exclude them, but if they fail to do so in express language, the warranties are regarded terms of the contract. 57
On the other hand, the cited section of the Sales Act demonstrates
again that statutory rules were regarded as jus cogens. The act pJaced
the implied terms in _contrast to the statutory conditions. Ergo, -customs or stipulations contrary to the merely implied obligations prevail
over the latter but not over the statutory obligations.5 8
It was not until the most recent years that .legislative acts have
shown a tendency to recognize that statutory rules might just as well be
shaped in the form of inflexible rules as in that of implied terms and
conditions; this new approach is expressed in phrases like 'unless the
parties have otherwise agreed upon" or "subject to special agreement"
and other words of similar effect.59
Still, however, one is anxious to retain the doctljne that the obligations created by such rules of jus dispositivum must be given a consensual form. Thus the initial paragraph of the Uniform .Vendor and
Purchaser Risk Act reads as follows: "Any contract shall be interpreted
unless the contract expressly provides otherwise, as including an agreement... ~'? The draftsmen, of course, knew the real character of such
obligations as creatures of statutory law.60 They knew that statutory or
common law optional rules are not any the less rules of law than all the
57 The cases are conflicting. See the cases collated in BOGERT AND BRITTON,
CASES ON THE LAW OF SALES 881, note l (1936).
·
58 "It should need no enumeration of authorities to show that no evidence of
custom or usage can be admitted, if it conflicts in any way with the statutory law."
Hubbard Fertilizer Co. v. American Trona Corp., 142 Md. 246 at 249, 120 A. 522
(1923) •
59
.
The Uniform Sales Act, a very recent legislative achievement is characteristic
of the present aspect of legislation, e.g. §§ 9, l 9, 20, 22, 42, 43, 44(4), 45 ( l), 46,
47(2), 49, 50. The Uniform Jendor & Purchaser Risk Act furnishes another illustration. It applies "unless the contract expressly provides otherwise." See, for another
example, N:Y. Real Property Law (McKinney, 1945) § 227. Where a statute lacks
such a reference, it will be construed as stating an "inflexible rule.", The results, no
doubt, are not always satisfactory. See, for instance, Matter of Caswell, 185 Misc. 599,
· 56 N.Y.S. (2d) 507 (1944), denying the possibility of a compromise concerning a
.,spendthrift trust upon the ground of- N.Y. Real Property Law (McKinney, 1945)
§ 103 and N.Y. Personal Property La~ (McKinney, 1938) § 15.
60
Harlan F. Stone, "Equitable Conversion by Contract," 13 CoL. L. REv. 369
at 371 (1913): " ... the 'presumed intention' •.• is only another way of saying that
it does not rest upon intention at all, but depends rather upon the operation of rules
of law, regardless of the intent of the owner." And Professor E. W. Patterson, "Constructive Conditions in Contracts," 42 CoL. L. REv. 903 (1942), therefore, would
prefer the expression "constructive conditions" to that of "implied conditions."

1

54

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

others and that the former differ from the latter only as a conditional
application of rules differs from an unconditional one. By the same
token, ,statutory and common law optional rules alike are often referred
to as "rules of construction." This phraseology was well suited to a
legal theory for which the notion "rules of law" became a synonym
with inflexible rules or rules not susceptible to their exclusion or recodification through a stipulation by the parties.
The conditional application inherent in the concept of flexible rules
must not be confused with the conditional avoidance of ~ transaction
because of its conflict with inflexible r-qles, that is, unconditionally controlling statutory rules. The difference is equal to that between the
question of validity and that of enforcement.
Let us exemplify the proposition. If in a will the testator, barring
the anti-lapse statute from any control over his dispositions, made a
gift over in the event that the legatee, his brother, predeceased him,
to a person unrelated to the testator, the gift is perfectly valid.61 The
case typifies the conditional nature of jus dispositivum. _
Concerning the other category, namely the conditional character of
an avoidance, let us assume that a party to be charged in an oral land
contract, for instance, t_he vendor, did not avoid the contract, but .
carried it out; by doing so, he waived a good defense and so made, ex
post, the contract binding. 62 Moreover, cases of estoppel may arise
which prevent the party from raising any objection against the enforceability of the bargain. In addition, once carried over into a deed delivered to the vendee; the oral agreement has merged in the latter
and the original omission of a written form may so be cured.63 And yet
the principal rigidity of the statutory rule finds expression in the proposition that the parties cannot in advance by stipulation preclude the
control of the bargain by the Statute of Frauds. They are no more able
thus to prevent the statute from invalidating an oral land contract than
they can in advance waive the benefit of the Statute of Limitation.64
Obviously, according to our system of pleading, failure to plead
this statute by demurrer (motion) or in the answer, concludes the
n E.g., Matter of Ney~orff, 193 App. Div. 531, 184 N.Y.S. 551 (1920) [with
respect to N.Y. Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, 1939) § 29].
62 Summers, "The Doctrine of Estoppel Applied to the Statute of Frauds," 79
UNIV. PA. L. REv. 440 (1931), quoting from St. Louis, K. & N. Ry. Co. v. Clark,
121 Mo. 169 at 186, 25 S.W. 192 (1894)
68
See 17 CORN L.Q. 290 (1932).
64
E.g., Shapley v,. Abbott, 42 N.Y. 443 (1870).

CoNTRACTS

55

defendant.611 However, the same result attends the omission to raise
other objections or denials even though they may concern requisites
indispensable for the validity of a contract.66 The distinction between
"mandatory" and "directory" is not germane to our problem. It is
directed primarily to the question whether the courts have discretion
in the enforcement of primary rights, and not to the control of the
parties over the contents of their contract. Thus under the Fair Labor'
,Standards Act the courts have been vexed by the problem whether
they are compelled to render a judgment for an additional amount
equal to the originally unpaid balance of minimum wages, if the employer had at last paid that balance before the commencement bf the
action. This classification goes to the discretion of the courts, not to
that of the parties and, therefore, does not coincide with that heretofore
discussed. 67

III
THE UsE AND NATURE OF REQUIRED TERMS

A. Statutory Methods of Requiring Terms
The methods which legislation may apply to force its objective
upon the contracting parties are multifarious. One category, that of
standard forms as used in the field of insurance, has been discussed
elsewhere in this paper. There are other methods worth discussing.
Let us look at labor legislation as the foremost field of prescribing
terms and conditions in recent years. There are three types of legislation: the legislature itself may formulate the exact terms; or _a statute
may authorize an administrative agency to formulate exact terms; or
the legislature may, by reference to certain types of transactions, prescribe terms .'which must be incorporated into contracts. The Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 applied the first two methods and even, indirectly, the third.one. The third type is best represented by collectivebargaining-contracts statutes. Acts of this type, such as the Labor Rela611
Where, for instance, the complaint alleged that there was consideration, although there was none, and the answer raised only affirmative defenses, the existence of
consideration is assumed for the purpose of the action.
66
E.g., in N.Y. Civil Practice Act (Cahill, 1937) § 242 and Court Rules 107 (8)
and IIO (8).
67
N.Y. Statutes (McKinney, 1942) § 171; e.g. Rigopoulos v. Kervan, (C.C.A.
2d, 1942) 140 F. (2d) 506. Related to the classification is that based on whether the
disregard of a provision by the court constitutes a mere irregularity or a fatal defect.
Foi: details see FREUND, LEGISLATIVE REGULATION 376 (1932).
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tions Acts and the National Railway Labor Act, prescribe wages, hours,
and working condition~ as scheduled in such statutes.

B. Choice of Statutory Methods
Quite naturally, the determination of"a method of entirely or partly
prescribing the contents of a bargain which befits the legislative objective, will depend upon a variety of considerations. Where the relationships concerned show great variations, the first mentioned type
seems to be impracticable. On the other hand, where the objective pursued by way of governmental intervention is a very narrow one, a
generalizing command is adequate. For example, during the period of
laissez-faire, the common law intervened in the master-servant rela,tionship only slightly, as by creating the obligation of a master. to provide for his servant a suitable and reasonably safe place to work. In
admiralty, the shipowner has,been since the Middle Ages under the
obligation to procure maintenance and cure for his seamen, if injured
or sick while in his seryice on the ship. Both obligations attach to the
employment contract upon entrance into the service, and neither of
them can be bargained away.68 Briefly, they show all the earmarks of
jus co gens, and their chief source will be found in legislative provisions.
It is now our purpose to consider to what extent these statutory requirements are consistent with existing Anglo-American theories of contract.

C. The Differentiation between Legal Commands for Consent,
Validity and Contents
It is a matter of common knowledge that the formation of a valid
and enforceable contract depends upon the compliance with certain
requirements. Properly, tlie distinction must be made between the
element called mutual understanding on the one hand and other elements of validity and enforceability on the other; such elements are
consideration, a written 'form, capacity of the parties, and legality of the
object of the contract.69 It is likewise self-evident that no stipulation
to the contrary between the parties can make a valid contract from a
68
For the "maintenance and cure" obligation, see the comprehensive discussion
in Hume v. Moore-McCormack Lines, (C.C.A. 2d, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 336; for the
rigor of the master's duty, likewise not subject to any waiver, see Narramore v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1899) 96 F. 298, and Johnston v. Fargo,
184 N.Y. 379, 77 N.E. 388 (1906) •
.a 9 ANSON, PRINCIPLES oF THE ENGLISH LAW OF CONTRACTS, 15th ed., 11
(1920).
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bargain deficient in a formative element/0 These 'initial formal requirements imposed by the law establish conditions designed to protect
the parties in giving and registering their con.sent to the bargain. Once
the fact of the bargain is est~blished, the law, at least in the past, has
allowed the parties to control its contents. On principle, the law left
it to the parties to agree on whatever they pleased, but would not leave
it to them to stipulate what, according to their own ideas, constituted
a sufficient consideration. The test of sufficiency, it was thought, must
be beyond the discretion of the parties. What has been said about the .
requirement of consideration holds true of the other requirements of
the second class.
Naturally the rigor inherent in this class softens to a slight degree
when the law offers a choice between several ways of meeting a requirement, as for instance, in the case of the Statute of Frauds with respect
to the sale of goods. 71
There is one feature of this topic which calls for emphasis. No one
has ever alleged that those requirements which are here grouped as a
"second class" present examples of a qualification of the freedom-ofcontract principle. It was always well understood that "freedom of
contract" means nothing more than freedom to stipulate the contents
of a contract.12
'
In order to develop a general theory as to the character of these
terms, we must first consider the effects of the statutory prescription.
We have pointed out that the common law was indisposed to regard
any terms either suggested or required by statute as co~tractual in nature. Even optional terms (jus dispositivum) were referred to the
parties' intention rather than to the intervention of the statute.78 By
contrast; required terms were considered to be non-contractual, although they deter.lllll1ed the contents of a contract freely entered into
-ro The understanding in the legal sense includes the indication to enter into an
enforceable bargain. Accordingly, when the parties mutually clearly negatived such
intention, no contractual understanding ensued. Rose & Frank Co. v. J. R. Compton
and Bros., Ltd., [1925] A.C. 445; Smith v. McDonald, 37 Cal. App. 503, 174 P.
80 (1918); see 37 HARv. L. REv. 154 (1923). Cf. 1 CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, § 5
(1932).
71
Uniform Sales Act, § 4(4); the Uniform Wills Act of 1910, § 1 furnishes
another example. See also N.Y. Decedent Estate Law (McKinney, 1939) § 22a.
72
Instructive on this point is the reasoning in Terwilliger v. Ontario, C. & S.
R.R. Co., 149 N.Y. 86 at 96, 43 N.E. 432 (1896).
78
Cf. Frank, J. in Beidler v. Bookmyer & Universal Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1943)
134 F. (2d) 828 at 829, 830.
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by the parties. We shall trace the mutations by which these terms have
become acclimated in the field of contract.
. The first change came when the legislature prescribed to the minutiae which terms and conditions contracts of certain types must contain.
Naturally it was not until public policy turned from keeping hands off
business transactions to that of having a hand in the regulation of certain business types, that this first change in the structur~ of statutory
law developed. Such a type eyolved in insurance law. Assuredly, for
a long tirrie there had been some regulations in the law of contracts.
They were limited, however, to the threshold requirements, particularly to the form of a~conti:act and.to prohibitions. Then the intervention of legislation expanded so as to control the contents. Where, now,
is he who would say that~ for example, the optional rights granted to
the insured with respect to the premium reserve must be deemed to be
non-contractual because of the statutory request to include such obligations in the contract? When conditions or terms attached to a contract
must be held contractual obligations jµst as much as party-made terms
or conditions, it can no longer be true that the contractual character
rests necessarily upon the intent of the parties. Did not the statutory
direction of what the parties have to include in their contracts logically
mean the proscription of such terms and conditions as are at variance
with them?
In Hicks v. British-American Assurance Company,74 the question
came up whether a mere oral understanding that plaint~:ff should be
insured against the fire risk of his building for a certain amount of·
money, constituted an insurance contract. The court of appeals found
that it did. Said the court: 7 G "The law reads into the [fire insurance]
contract the standard policy ...," and the court added:"· .. the conversation disclosed the sum for whi~h the property was to be insured, the
amount of premiums and the period of insurance, and the statute provided for all of the other conditions of the contract of insurance." It
is very important to note that the court said further that this was still
recovery on the contract.
Surely the statutory formulation of detaile~ provisions 76 must be
74

162 N.Y. 284, 56 N.E. 743 (1900).
Id. at 288, 289.
76
E.g., N.Y. Workmen's Comp. L~w (McKinney, 1938) § 54 (1): "Every
policy of insurance covering the liability of the employer for compensation ••• shall
contain a provision setting forth .•••" (then, in the next four subdivisions, other terms
are prescribed which have to be inserted in the insurance policy). See further, N.Y.
Ins. Law (McKinney, 1940) §§ 155, 158 (2), 159-164, 167, 168; no policy of life,
7

G
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preferred to administrative regulation, if for no other reason than because of constitutional scruples.77 However, this was certainly not the
only consideration for the statutory prescription of a model contract.
What, then, was it? To answer the question is to repeat the preceding
discussion on the theory of English statutory law and the doctrine of
implied terms and conditions. Briefly, in requiring the insurer to insert
into his policies the terms and conditions prescribed, the statute's voice
assumes a consensual rather than an'authoritative character. Yet before
we continue the discussion on the nature of required terms, two other
questions must be raised.

D. Departures from the Prescribed Formulation
Does the prescription of terms by legislation inexorably turn the
contractors into simple copyists of the verba legis? Is, under all circumstances, such formulation of the terms to be regarded as exclusive? Or
how far, if at all, does such legislation permit the parties to alter or
modify the model? One may indeed ask why it should be appropriate
to require adherence ad verbum, when the policy behind the legislative
command points to the protection of a certain class of persons to which
only one of the two contractors belongs. Then it seems to be rather the
nature of such a legislative act that the legislative demand constitutes
a minimum condition. If so, no obstacle can be seen to alterations or
modifications of minimum requirements for the benefit of a member of
the protected class.
At the time of this writing, however, the suggestion here submitted
group life, annuity, group annuity, group accident, industrial life, accident or health,
liability or fire insurance shall be issued unless the same contains all the clauses set
forth in those sections. As for fire insurance, the entire contents is prescribed in form
of a standard policy. See Patterson, "Administrative Control of Insurance Policy
Forms," 2 5 CoL. L. REv. 2 53 at 267 ( 192 5). The method is not restricted to insurance law. See, for example, N.Y. Personal Property Law (McKinney, Supp. 1946)
§ 64a (conditional sales), and the English Hire-Purchase Act, 1938, 1 and 2 G~o. 6,
c. 53, § 2.
.
77 It was Massachusetts which in I 873 invented the method of legislating standardizing provisions in insurance law, yet then it was still jus dispositivum. For the
history of this standard form see Wild Rice Lumber Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 99 Minn.
190, 108 N.W. 871 (1906). In 1881 Michigan arrd in 1886 New York created the
inflexible standard type. Quinlan v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 133 N.Y. 356, 31
N.E. 31 (1892). However, in 1905, a Michigan court declared the Michigan statute
unconstitutional. For more details, see RICHARDS, LAW OF INSURANCE, 3d ed:, 278
(1910), and Patterson, "Administrative Control of Insurance Policy Forms," 25 CoL.
L. REv. 253 (1925). The present New York standard fire policy was first prescribed
in 1917. Its last form is of 1943, N.Y. Laws (1943) c. 671, N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney, Supp. 1946) § 168 (6).
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has not yet been accepted with universal favor by the courts. A ·few
years ago an insured, to'whom there was delivered a :fire insurance pol. icy .in complete .conformity to the standard form, sued for reformation
of the poJicy upon the ground that conditions more favorable to him
had been agreed upon. But the Wisconsin courts rejected his demands.18
They were not the only ones to deny it. When a legislature has provided for a standard form, the question whether the parties may vary
its contents has been answered in the negative in many a jurisdiction.79
Few courts appear to be more inclined to recognize the power of the
parties to modify the model for the benefit of a memQer of the protected class. 80 A most recent legislation on insurance, the New York
Insurance Law,81 in general allows 82 variations, provided that° they are
"in the opinion ·of the Superintendent of Insurance more favorable to
the insured." 88 There are other jurisdictions in which the insurer is
unqualifiedly authorized to insert in the policies provisions more liberal
'to the clients than the statute prescribed. 84
Certainly one has to beware of pronouncing a general principle of
liberalization as to modifications of the statutory enactments. What
might. be tolerable in the :field of labor law might lead to mischiefs in
other :fields. As the collapse of large European insurance enterprises
in' the last decade demonstrated., a competition might be conducted by
undercutting in premiums as well as by exceeding statutory ·minimum
conditions, with damaging results to the public at large. 85
•
In the :field of labor relations, the binding effect of schedul~s of
wages, hours, and working conditions agreed upon in collective bargaining contracts upon non-members of the unit can be explained only
18

Ottens v. Atlas Assur. Co., Ltd., 226 Wis. 596, 275 N.W. 900 (1937). Similarly, First National Bank v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., II8 Pa. Super. 582, 180 A. 163
(1935).
,
19
1 CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INsuRANCE LAw, § 72a, p. 97 (1929).
so Aetna Life v. Hardison, 199 Mass. 181, 85 N.E. 407-(1908).
81
N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney, 1940) §§ 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163.
82
As to fire insurance, see Standard Policy, 1943, line 45-46 [N.Y. Ins. Law
(McKinney, .Supp. 1946) § 168]. As for accident and health insurance, the statute
prescribes even "the optional standard provisions," id., § 164 (4).
83
The finding on this point is now placed in the regulatory and discretionary
power of the ad111inistrator, while formerly the partie,s were left full freedom in this
regard. Hopkins· v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 225 N.Y. 76, 121 N.E. 465 (1918).
84
E.g., where the statutory con.testability period is limited to three years, the company may restrict it, fdr instance, to one year. This was the holding, under such a
statute [S.D. Code (1939) 31.1508] in Policy Holder's Nat. Life Ins. Co. v.
Harding, (C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 147 F. (2d) 851.
85
Cf. LENHOFF, DAS WETTBEWERBSPROBLEM IM VERSJCHERUNGSRECHT 9 et seq.
(1937).
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upon the theory of statutory regulations.86 It is obvious that no collective bargaining contract, any more than any other contract, can impose'
its schedules upon· persons other than the contracting parties ( or their
privies). But a statute can do so either by direct prescription of the
terms or, as in the case of collective contracts, by reference to the schedules as fixed in trade agreements between employer and union.87 Clearly the latter method has the advantage over the former, that periodical
changes will be obtainable much more easily.
Here again one is faced with the question whether such regufo.tion
is unalterable or subject to modifications more favorable for the employee.88 But even in this field of law the validity of terms thus modified might be questioned whenever the policy behind the statute shows
great distrust of any departure from the path laid out by the legislature.
This is particularly true of labor relations statutes.89

E. Effects of Omitting Required Terms
Finally, in the event that the contract does not contain the prescribed terms and conditions, the formulation of the essential parts of
the contents in the statute protects the transaction from destruction
whereas a mere prohibition could not save it. It is the latter effect
which also weighs heavy in the mind of a legislature faced with the
choice between a formulation of contractual provisions or of statutory
pr.ohibitions. Where the contents of a contract conflict with statutory
prohibitions, courts are not inclined to perform juristic surgery by saving the good parts and excising the bad ones,° 0 but it is easy for them
86 The foremost representative among such statutes are National Railway Labor
Act, §2 (4) (9), and the National Labor Relations Act,§ 9(a). For details, see Lenhoff, ''The Present Status of Collective Contracts in the American Legal System," 39
MxcH L. REv. no9 at II37 et seq. (1941). For discussion on the constitutional
problem and the dividing line to be drawn between those statutes and the kind of
legislation underlying Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 56 S. Ct. 855 (1936),
see Lenhoff, id. at II37, note 94.
87 As the legal history of collective bargaining contracts shows, the courts refused
to concede that the schedules of such contracts had an automatically binding effect upon
an individual employment relationship, until a statute was enacted giving them such
an effect. Cf. 2 HuECK UND N1PPERDEY, LEHRBUCH DES ARBEITSRECHTS, 3d ed., 35
(1932). In this country, see J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 64 S. Ct. 576
(1944). Conversely, in absence of a statute, the courts denied such effect, e.g., decision
of Czechoslovakian Supreme Court 1925, II, II, in 8 Prager Archiv 88 (1926).
88 Order of R.R. Tel. v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 64 S. Ct. 582
(1944).
89 Justice Jackson in J. I. Case v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 64 S. Ct. 576 (1944).
go Formerly the English courts regarded violation of a statute as fatal under any
circumstances, an effect which probably originated the simile elsewhere mentioned of
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to replace nonconforming provisions by terms and conditions statutorily prescribed.
It will be seen that such process of replacement has been generally
resorted to wherever the contents of a contract conflicted with those
prescribed by the law. And many statutes expressly state that in case
of such a conflict the prescribed provisions must be regarded as parts of
the contract.91 . This amounts to a substitution of the prescribed provisions for the nonconforming terms. For example, Congress proceeded
in this manner in the famous Joint Resolution which proscribed all
kinds of gold clauses in contracts; illegal stipulations were deem1:d to
be replaced by the statutory terms according to which the obligations
were dischargeable by payment, dollar for dollar, in legal tender.92
Very frequently statutes prescribe the contents of a special contractor's bond along with the conclusive statutory presumption that such
bond is deemed to be drawn in accordance with the statutory contents,
regardless of whether the actual Gontents of the bond conform to the
statutory requirement.98
·
Even in the absence of a legislative directive, the courts, as noted
before, have come to the same result.94 Reading the statute as if its
the tyrant. A conflict between the contract and the c~mmon law prohibition was
looked upon more mildly, for "the common law" was construed as "dividing according
to common reason." Norton v. Symmes, [K.B. 1614] Hob. 12, So Eng. Rep. 163.
" ..• the common law [in contrast to a statute] is like a nursing father, makes void only
that part where the fault is and preserves the rest." Maleverer v. Redshaw, [K.B.
1669] l Mod. 35, 86 Eng. Rep. 712. Now, this is long past; neither the former nor
the latter proposition is true and, as no violation of a statutory prohibition destroys the
contract, so. a contract restraining, for instance, the employee in the utilization of his
knowledge or ski!]. acquired in the promisee's employment may be held to be unenforceable although it conflicts only with the common law principle and not always with
the statutory rule. Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N.J. Eq. 370, 22 A. 348, (1891); Driver
v. Smith, 89 N.J. Eq. 339, 104 A. 77 (1918). Yet see General Mills, Inc. v. Steele,
(C.C.A. 5th, 1946) 154 F. (2d) 367.
91 Cf. the phrase frequently used in statutes "anything ..• to the contrary notwithstanding." Equitable Life Assurance Soc. v. Clements, 140 U.S. 226, 11 K Ct.
822 (1891). And see further, J):nglish Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, 57 and 58
Viet., c. 60, § 45 8.
92
48 Stat. L. n3 (1933), 31 U.S.C. (1940) § 463.
93 Compare the statute involved in ,Maryland Casualty Co. v. Fowler, (C.C.A.
4th, 1929) 31 F. (2d) 881 and 63 A.L.R. 1381 (1929).
94 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389, 20 S. Ct. 962 (1900);
Philip Carey Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 201 Iowa 1063, 206 N.W. 1808 (1926)
(statutory provisions concerning contents of a contractor's bond); Lorando v. Gethro,
228 Mass. 181, II7 N.E. 185 (1917) (insurance); Roeser v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
162 Misc. 798 at 800,296 N.Y.S. 585 (1936): " •.• it is settled law that even if the
policy had contained a contrary stipulation, the standard provisions of the statute would
nevertheless govern pie contract of insurance."
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terms had been written into the contract, the courts do not find any
difficulty in replacing conflicting provisions with prescribed terms.9 ~
They vary in their approach, but they agree on the result.
One approach has been to consider the party estopped from putting
in the eithei---or proposition, under which he could either have the contract enforced under stipulated terms or have it rendere_!i nugatory. He
cannot be placed in a better position on account of his noncompliance
with the legal command than he should be if he had lived up to it.96
The fact that he had obtained the other party's consent to the nonconforming stipulation is immaterial. Terms are prescribed in the
interest of the members of a particular class to which the other party
belongs. It is for this reason that the defense cannot be heard that
both were in pari delicto. Consequently, even though, for example, the
applicant for a job fraudulently misrepresented his age, he was held
entitled to the statutory wage rate scheduled for the higher wage
bracket.97
No attempt is made here to reconcile the innumerable s~ate decisions on the question of waiver respecting terms which were not subject
to bargaining.98 Whatever the construction, the claim in such cases
rests ultimately upon statutory direction.99 This explains why today
the main current of opinion is inclined to deny the defense of waiver,
not only as to the mere executory portion, but even with respect to the
executed portion of the contract.100 ,
Not a few courts have placed this result upon the ground of the
lack of consideration for the release implied in the acceptance by the ·
promisee of the substandard performance made by the promisor.101
One might, perhaps with better reason, say that the statutory· provisions which prescribed the contents of the obligations denied to the
96

VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., 239 (1930).
Johnson v. Hartland Farmer's Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Wis. 77, 264 N.W. 480
(1936).
97
Walsh v. Commercial Travellers' Assn., [1940] Viet. L.R. 259, noted 54
HARV. L. REv. 515 (1941).
98
Cases collated in 70 A.L.R. 972 ( 193 l) •
99
Satterlee v. Bd. of Police, 7 5 N. Y. 38 , ( 187 8) ; Bodenhofer v. Hogan, 142
Iowa 321, 120 N.W. 659 (1909), and note thereto, 19 Ann. Cas. 1073 (19II) (with
cases collated.)
,
ioo 6 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 1730 (1938).
101
United States v. Morley Const. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 781;
Hamilton v. Edmundson, 235 Ala. 97, 177 S. 743 (1937); Pitt v. Bd. of Education,
216 N.Y. 304, II0 N.E. 612 (1915); contra, Ryan v. New York, 177 N.Y. 271, 69
N.E. 599 (1904).
98
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members of the protected class the capacity to waive' rights secured by
them.
·

F. Are Required Terms Contractual in N0rture?
By another view,1one might regard the party charged with the
obligation as having, ·by entering into the bargain, consented to the
subordinfl.tion of the stipulations to the prescribed terms.102 In taking
this approach, courts might find it easier to construe even that portic;m
of the contents, which is nothing more than a copy of the statutory provisions, to be of consensual rather than of heteronomous character.
'•. Thus, in deciding that the prescribed terms, if at variance with the
stipulations of the parties, prevail over the latter, the courts put the
former 9n the same level as express terms. It is faulty to apply the
expression "implied obligations" or "implied terms and conditions" to
them, for, if they were implied, they should be subject to the stipulations of the parties and not the other way around. Nothing could more
strongly bear out the idea of the contractual nature of required terms
than the recent decision rendered by the highest court of Micliigan in
Life Insurance Company of Detroit v. Burton.108 The court directed
the reformation of a bond solely upon the ground that terms, the incorporation of which was required by statute, had been omitted.
The logical process is similar to that resorted to by the cou:i:ts in
order to restrict the scope of stipulations which: limit or exclude a
seller's warranty. Does not the Uniform Sales Act class the seller's
obligation inherent in the description of the goods, e.g., of a "new
, automobile," among the implied warranties? Yet it was held that a .
disclaimer referring to "all conditions, warranties and liabilities implied
by statute" did not eliminate the liability of the seller for the breach of
an express term, embodied in t~e words "new automobile." m If this
is so here, there would be even more reason for it to be tn~e for terms
which cannot be precluded from the contract by the parties. To contract
for a bargain of a certain type means in the eyes of fhe law to include
therein the terms as required by law.
In a similar vein, the courts hold that the double liability imposed
upon a stockholder for the benefit of the creditors of a corporation is
1 2
il Lorando v. Gethro, 228 Mass. 181, II7 N.E. 185 (1917); Matter of Metropolitan Life lQ.s. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y. 449 at 452, 169 N.E. 642 (1930); Patterson, "Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball," 43 CoL. L. REv. 731 at 742 (1943).
103
306 Mich.. 81, 10 N.W. (2d) 315 (1943) •.
104
Andrews Bros., Ltd. v. S!nger and Co., Ltd., [ 1934] 1 K.B. 17 (§ 13 of the
English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, co_rresponding to Uniform Sales Act, § 14).
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"contrao:ual in nature, although statutory in origin." 105 As interpreted
by them, the statute puts a liability clause into every subscription or
purchase' of stock, a clause according to which the stockholder assumes a liability for an assessment in accordance with the terms of the
statute. In other· words, by voluntarily becoming a stockholder, he
incurs a liability, which, although originating in the legal command,
becomes an express term of his contract.106
The significance of this interpretation can easily be seen. In the :first
place, there is no room for objections which otherwise could be raised
against an action based upon the liability and brought in any jurisdiction where a stockholder may be found; 101 i.e., the obligation does
not rest upon a penal statute to which no extra-territorial effects can
be given. In the second place, a stockholder is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the state of incorporation with respect to
the assessment as an incident to the contract. Third, the application
by the courts of the contract statute of 1limitations is on all fours with
their construction of the liability as a cbntractual one.108
Among the various classes of prescribed obligations there is a
hierarchy depending upon th~ degree of subordination of one to the
other. For example, wage or overtime schedules of a collective bargaining contract, made under section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, must not conflict with the analogous commands of the Fair
Labor Standards Act. 109 Likewise, where a standardized form in an
105

Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 57 S. Ct. 543 (1937); Chisholm v. Gilmer,
299 U.S. 99, 57 S. Ct. 65 (1936); Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 S. Ct,
589 (1935); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243, 32 S. Ct. 415 (1912); Bernheimer
v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516, 27 S. Ct. 755 (1907)s Whitman v. Oxford National
Bank, 176 U.S. 559, 20 S. Ct. 477 (1900); Flash v. Conn, 109 U.S. 371, 3 S. Ct.
263 (1883); particularly Pulsifer v. Greene, 96 Me. 438, 52 A. 921 (1902); Wiles
v. Suydam, 64 N.Y. 173 (1876). Cf. Hohfeld, "Nature of Stockholders' Individual
Liability for Corporation Debts," 9 CoL. L. REv. 285, particularly 308, 313 (1909).
106
Platt v. Wilmot, 193 U.S. 602, 24 S. Ct. 542 (1904); Anderson v. Andrews,
(D.C. Pa. 1945) 62 F. Supp. 705 [for facts of this case, see Anderson v. Abbott, 321
U.S. 349, 64 S. Ct. 531 (1944) ]. .
107
See cases cited iti note 105; supra, and Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U.S. 221,
34 S. Ct. 312 (1914).
108
Pufahl v. Parks' Estate, 299 U.S. 217, 57 S. Ct. 151 (1936); McDonald v.
Thompson, 184 U.S. 71, 22 S. Ct. 297 (1902); Anderson v. Andrews, (D.C. Pa.
1945) 62 F. Supp. 705.
109
For the discretion given. to collective contracts in this respect, see Fair Labor
Standards Act, § 7 (b). Yet beyond that scope, terms of collective contracts cannot
,supersede statutory terms. Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Company, (U.S.
1946) 66 S. Ct. 379.
0
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insurance policy is in the teeth of a statutory provision, the courts will
proclaim the superiority of the latter over the former. 110
This brings up the question whether the rules applied by the courts
for the construction of a cpntract hold true of its construction with
regard to terms a:nd conditions carried over in a contract from prescribed forms or other legislative provisions. Are ambiguities in such
contract to be construed against the party which drafted the document?
It is one thing to give an obligation imposed upon the draftsman by
law a consensual character, and it is an entirely different thing to treat
it so for the purpose of its construction. After ~ll, that rule of construction originated in the consideration that doubts concerning expressions
must be resolved against him who 'chose them. No one will allege
that the obligations discussed here were formulated by_ the companies
· which inserted them in their contract forms. Accordingly, the majority •
of the courts 111 have been prone not to charge them for ambiguities in
the language of standard policies.112 As the New York Court of Appeals held, the parties showed no volition in the words or shape of prescribed terms.118
Similarly, a limitation period incorporated by statute in the contract
is interpreted as a general Statute of Limitation rather than as a term
of the contract.114
Thus, seven observations upon the nature of required terms may be
submitted.
(r) Terms and conditic;ms imposed by law, upon the contracting
'parties are enforceable by the obligee against the obligor qua obligor.115
11
°Fadanelli v. Nat. Security Fire Ins., II3 Neb. 830, '205 N.W. 642 (1925)
(standard fire policy provision, held, yielding to valued-policy statute).
111
The minority view can be seen froni Friend v. Business Men's Assur. Co., 141
Kan. 470, 41 P. (2d) 759 (1935); Dunton v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., rn4 Me.
372, 71 A. 1037 (1908); Gratz v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 282 Pa. 224, 127 A. 620
(1925); to the same effect VANCE, INSURANCE, 2d ed., 690 (1930).
112
Funk v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., (C.C.A. 9th, 1938) 95 F. (2d) 38; Shaw v.
United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1938) 101 F. (2d) 92; Qallopin v. Continental Casualty Co., 290 Ill. App. 8, 7 N.E. ,(2d) 771 (1937); MacBey
v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 292 Mass. 105, 197 N.E. 516 (1935); Wilcox
v. Mass. Protective Assn., 266 Mass. 230, 165 N.E. 429 (1929); Heim v. Am.
Alliance Ins. Co., 147 Minn. 283, 180 N.W. 225 (1920); Temple v. Niagara Fire
Ins. Co., 109 Wis. 372, 85 N.W. 361 (i901).
113
Hamilton v. Royal Ins. Co., 156 N.Y. 327 at 336, 50 N.E. 863 (1898).
114 Id. at 337.
115
"The alleged obliger does 'consent' to enter into the type of agreement on
which the statute is predicated, even when he signs an instrument which does not in
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It would be strange indeed if the character of such obligations had to
vary according to whether or not the parties wrote the legal command
expressly into the document. The courts did not hesitate to hold the
United States liable under the Tucker Act upon terms imposed by law
on a contracting party, for instance, a lessee. In other words, they had
to construe the obligations to be contractual, for otherwise the Tucker
Act could not have applied.ms
(2) As to the contractual character of the obligation, there is no
difference between prescribed terms and implied terms. If, for example, a contract which contains an obligation t~ pay the principal sum
with interest at a certain future time is entirely silent as to the interest
rate, the legal rate becomes the contractual one.
(3) Viewed from the angle of constitutional law, the fact that the
subject matter of an obligation was prescribed by legislation may have
significance. When, for example, during the depression era of the
thirties, it became necessary to reduce interest or to suspend its payment, the statutory provision making the interest rate prior to maturity applicable after maturity, was held not within the prohibition of
the contract clause, though in fact the parties had expressly adopted the
statutory provision.111 In short, the post-maturity period is entirely
within the control of the legislature.
( 4) Likewise, the source from which the terms and conditions are
derived affects the method of interpretation which is appropriate. The
majority of the courts applied the same method to their interpretation
as to that of l~gislative acts generally; similarly, the courts will take
some particulars conform." Patterson, "Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball,"· 43
CoL. L. REv. 731 at 742 (1943).
116
24 Stat. L. 505 (1887), 28 U.S.C. (1940) § 250 ("••• upon any contract,
expressed or implied, with the Government of the United States, or for damages •.. in
cases not sounding in tort ..."). Cf. Herren v. Farm Security Adm., (D.C. Ark, 1945)
60 F. Supp. 694. ·
117
Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. 2846 Briggs Ave., Inc., 283 N.Y. 512, 29
N.E. (2d) 66 (1940). Where th~ contract is silent on the interest rate as payable
after maturity, the statutory rate applies and not the rate stipulated for the time preceding the maturity. Metropolitan Savings Bank v. Tuttle, 290 N.Y. 497, 49 N.E.
(2d) 983 (1943). With full recognition of this principle, one cannot deny the contractual character of the obligation to pay the interest; ergo, for the choice of the
applicable statute, the court will look to the law of the place of performance. In re
Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co., (D.C. Minn. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 151.
Courts have to face a "contract-clause" problem also with respect to the lien
created by statutory provision, e.g., mechanic's lien, where such lien was not framed
explicitly as a contractual stipulation. For the conflicting decisions concerning the
constitutionality of statutory changes affecting contracts involving such liens, see 158
A.L.R. 1043 at 1046 (1945).
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judicial notice of tliem as they do of the so~rces in which the terms
originated.118
(5) Violations of statutory law, at least of that which belongs to
the prescribed-terms class '(in contrast to the prohibitory class)· no
longer render the bargain void; for they are deemed as much expressed
- in the contract as the contrary stipulations actually are. The results
reached by the courts, ev_en in absence of a legislative directive, accord
with the general trend demonstrated in a great ma~y, statutory provisions. A few examples, taken from the property law, labor law, and
insurance law, will serve to illustrate. ·
A direction in a deed or will for the accumulation of rents and
profits which exceeds the statutory time limits remains valid for the
time permitted, so that it is void only as to the time 1.n excess thereof.119
The Nadonal Railway Labor Act directs every carrier to include
in certain notices to be given to its employees enumerated sections of
the act; these provisions are by statutory command made a part of the
employment contract and "shall be held binding upon the parties regardless of any other express or implied agreements between them."120
According to the recent New York Insurance Act, any contract or
policy of insurance or annuity contract made in violation of the provisions of the act shall be valid and binding upon the insurer, but in all
respects in which its provisions are in violation of the requirements of
the statute it shall be enforceable as if it conformed wjth such requirements.121
,
'
Looking at the recent legislation from the historical point of view,
one notices that its course has only reaffirmed on a large scale a tendency which common law has shown for a long time, namely the
tendency to save, if possible, a bargain from total destruction. With
the exception of New York 122 and of a very few other states, the Amer118

In_ contz:ast to customs. Where the customs constitute a part of a contract, they
must be pleaded and proved. Phoenix Iron & Steel Co. v. Wilkoff Co., (C.C.A. 6th,
1918) 253 F'. 165; Terminal 'R. Assn. of St. Louis v. Schorb, (C.C.A. 8th, 1945)
15 I F. ( 2d) 36 I. Accordingly, the same is true of the terms of a collective bargaining
contract. It is the statute, e.g. NLRA, § 9(a), which provides for their incorporation
in the individual employment contract. Lenhoff, "The Present Status of Collectiv,e
Contracts in the American Legal System," 39 M1cH. L. REv. II09 at u37 (1941).
119
N.Y. Real Property Law (McKinney, 1945) § 61 (1) (3); N.Y. Personal
Property Law (McKinney, 1938) § 16 (1) (3). See also Real P.roperty Law (McKinney, 1945) § 169:
120 National Railway Labor Act, § 2(8).
121 N.Y. Laws (1939) c. 882, N.Y. Ins. Law (McKinney, Supp. 1946) §143(1).
122 Sabine v. Paine, 223 N.Y. 401, n9 N.E. 849 (1918); cf. N.Y. Gen. Bus.
Law (McKinney, 1941) § 373. The lender can recover neither principal nor legal
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ican courts have held that the charge in excess of the permissible interest rate does not void the entire contract both as to interest and
principal, but voids only the stipulation as to the excess interest.123 And
it has been recognized from time immemorial that a waiver of the right
to redeem a mortgage does not invalidate the entire mortgage, but
only that waiver. 124
( 6) The axiom that there could not be a contractual obligation
without 1ntention haunted the courts so as to induce them to a petitio
principii. From the general proposition that the contract is a voluntary
transaction, judges have improperly assumed that a feature of the
contract imposed in invitum cannot be part of the contract proper. No
less a jurist than Justice Cardozo, in speaking for the New York Court
of Appeals, in Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., based his argument
for the tortious nature of the master's obligation to the servant upon
its non-waivable character.125 When he, fifteen years later, then a Justice of the United States Supreme Court, analysed the maritime maintenance-and-cure obligation, his dicta admitted its contractual nature,
adding only that it has no strict contractuql character because "no agreement is competent to abrogate the incident." 120 •
The contractual character of the right• to maintenance and cure
has been consistently recognized by the Supreme Court. In Pacific
Steamship Co. v. Peterson 121 the plaintiff, a seaman, had accepted
· maintenance and cure. Subsequently he brought an action under the
Jones Act 128 for neglig-ent injuries. The defendant pleaded an election
interest. In this regard, the New York law conforms to the early English law which
held the whole bargain to be illegal.
123
2 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT,§§ 526 and 535 and comments, p. 1021 (1932).
See Uniform Small Loan Law, §'13.
124
Cf. TIFFANY, REAL PROPER~ § 850 (1940); Mooney v. Byrne, 163 N.Y.
86, 57 N.E. 163 (1900). The same is true of other stipulations, by which the one
party unlawfully waived protective rights imposed upon the other such as exemption
privileges of a debtor or restrictions upon an automatic renewal clause in favor of the
tenant. Such a waiver is void even when the statute does not contain an express prohibition against the waiver. Kneettle v. Newcomb, 22 N.Y. 249 (1860); Crowe v.
Liquid Carbonic Co., 208 N.Y. 396, 102 N.E. 573 (1913); Wood Co. v. Horgan,
291 N.Y. 422, 52 N.E. (2d) 932 (1943). Yet all the other terms of the contract
remain unaffected. The same result was reached in Siegel v. Bowers, 185 Misc. 684,
58 N.Y.S. (2d) 187 (1946) (compromise of landlord's nuisance action, containing
other clauses conflicting with Rent Regulations).
125
Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 224 N.Y. 9 at I I , 121 N.E. 891 (1918).
126
Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line,· Inc., 287 U.S. 367 at 371, '53 S. Ct. 173
(1932).
121
278 U.S. 130, 49 S. Ct.. 75 (1928).
128
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, § 33, 41 Stat. L. 988 at 1'007, 46 U.S.C.
(1940) § 688.
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of remedies. The court replied: "the right to maintenance, cure and
wages, implied in law as a contractual obligation arising out of the
nature of the employment, is independent of the right to. indemnity or
compensatory damages for an injury caused by negligence...." 129 ,
On the other hand, the seaman would be compelled to elect between
this action under the Jones Act, and the common law maritime action
for injuries due to unseaworthiness,180 for " ... there is but a ·single
wrongful invasion of his primary right of bodily safety....." 181
. In short, the bargain-proof nature of an obligation incidental to a
contractual relationship such as the employment relationship cannot
be the 'test for the denial of its contractual character. Nor can culpability constitute the criterion; true, the maintenance and cure obligation
exists even in absence of any negligence on the part of the shipowner,
but, according to the main current of opinion, so does the damage claim
based upon general maritime law.132
The variance between the nature of the two types of claims can be
explained by an analysis of the rights which the parties have inter se:
The right to maintenance and cure, like other forms of compensation
for services, runs to the seaman himself; 138 the seaman, however, has
no actionable right against the owner to the e:ffect that the latter put
the vessel into a state of seaworthiness. Nor can a servant compel his
master to supply a safe place and safe tools. The duty regarding seaworthiness of a ship and safety of the workshop does not run to an
individual; they are imposed upon shipowner and master only in the
interest of public health and public safety. Naturally, legislation may
be shown to have a wider scope which includes particular duties to the
employees. On this point it is worth noting that in many civil law
countries analogous pr~visions of the civil codes were construed as if
129

Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 at 138, 49 S. Ct. 75 (1928).
Plamals v. S.S. "Pinar Del Rio," 277 U.S. 151, 48 S. Ct. 457 (1928);
Brown v. C. D. Mallory, (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 12,z F. (2d) 98; Skolar v. Lehigh Valley
R. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1932) 60 F. (2d) 893; cf. also Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips,
274 U.S. 316, 47 S. Ct, 600 (1927). (After the suit brought under the general
maritime law had failed, a new complaint based upon the Jones Act held barred, because of res adjudicata.) Cf. Aguilar v. Standard Oil of New Jersey, 318 U.S. 724,
63 S. Ct. 930 (1943).
131
Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 at 138, 49 S. Ct. 75 (1928).
132
Sieracki v. Seas Shipping Co.,_ (C.C.A. 3d, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 98, noted,
59 HARV. L. REv. 127 (1945); cf. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96,
64 S. Ct. 455 (1944).
133
See the rationale in Brown v. C. D. Mallory, (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 122 F. (2d)
98.
130
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they created a contractual right of the employees against the employer
for the safety of the place.134
It might be more than a fair guess to trace the different construction in American law to the belief that imposed duties are inconsistent
with a contractual construction. One must not forget that the invention of implied warranties in sales was not made until the Nineteenth
Century, when the duties of the master and shipo~ner had been recognized for a long time.
The practical significance can be seen in the situation in which the
plaintiff's safety depended upon a fellow employee's conduct; then,
without statutory changes,135 the master was held to be relieved from
any liability.136 If he had been burdened with a contractual obligation,
the result would have had to be different. Furthermore, contributory
negligence would not have been a defense.137
In recent years, we notice how completely the courts accept the
proposition that terms required by legislation are treated exactly as
promises in the sense that the plaintiff recovers the value of the promise rather than merely such damages as flow from the violation of the
statute. The Fair Labor, Standards Act furnishes a splendid ,illustration.138 Under it an employee has a right to the statutory rates of pay
regardless of any contrary stipulation.189 Certainly employer and employee may establish the correct rates directly by contract at1d, in doubt184 S. M. v. Deutsches Reich, 95 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts (N.F.) 103
(1919); (Austrian Supreme Court, March 9, 1937) 19 SZ. No. 75; and 12 Reports
of the Austrian Labor Courts No. 433 (1933) (right to specific performance).
185 Cl!iefl.y conspicuous for such expressions are the Federal Employer Liability
Act, 35 Stat. L. 65 (1908), as amended by 53 Stat. L. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.
(1940) § 51 et seq., and the Jones Act, 41 Stat. L. 988 at 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C.
( 1940) § 688, cited note 128, supra, the latter incorporating the pertinent contents of
the former.
186 Holliday v. Fultan Band Mill, (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 1006 at
1007; Anderson v. Scheuerman, 232 Iowa 705, 6 N.W. (2d) 125 (1942). A discussion of the qualifications produced by the so-called vice-principal doctrine is outside the
scope of this paper.
137 Naturally, the inadequacy of the principle stimulated the ingenuity of judicial reasoning in order to deny such negligence on the part of the employee; this is
illustrated also by the attacks against the simple-tool doctrine, with the aim to restrict
the defense of contributory negligence and of exemption of risk. See Jacob v. City of
New York, 315 U.S. 752, 62 S.Ct. 854 (1942), and Adam v. Konvalinka, 291 N.Y.
40, 50 N.E. (2d) 535 (1943).
138 58 Stat. L. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 201 et seq.
189
Wailing v. Belo Corp., 3 16 U.S. 624, 62. S. Ct. 1223 ( 1942); Brooklyn
Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 65 S. Ct. 895 (1945).
,
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ful cases, the terms as contracted for will be held to be proper.140 But,
if they fail to make such stipulations or if the stipulations as made fall
short of the terms as prescribed, then the latter, not the former, are
deemed to constitute ·the contents of the contract.141 And more than
that, the "liquidated damages" provision of the law has been construed
· as a contractual compensation rather than a penalty, a construction
which had a bearing upon the question of constitutionality,142 jurisdiction,148 exclusion of judicial discretion,144 recovery of interest from the
time of the default on 145 and, finally, upon the Statute of Limitations.148
Here, again, as discussed elsewhere. in this paper with respect to standard policies in insurance law, the prescribed terms entered the contract
without, or even again'.st, the will of the employer.

( 7) There remains the question whether the requirement that the
contractor must write the required terms into the contract has any different effects from the simple statutory declaration of the terms. Incidentally, 'the requirement may produce uncertainty as to the effects
of divergencies and omissions, but a more important effect may be the
paradox that the intended benefits of the statute may be denied to the
very class for whom it was enacted.
,
140 Harnischfeger Corp. v. Walling, 325 U.S. 427, 65 S. Ct. 1246 (1945);
Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37, 65 S. Ct. II (1943); Tennessee
Coal Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda, 321 U.S. 590, 64 S. Ct. 698 (1944).
141 Jewell Rich 'Coal Co. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161, 65 S. Ct. 1063
!
(1945); Northwestern Yeast Co. v. Broutin, (C.C.A. 6th, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 628
at 631.
142 Overnight Motor Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 6;z S. Ct. 1216
(1941) (question of due process).
148
•
Thus, state courts have jurisdiction under section 16 of F.L.S.A. ("competent
jurisdiction"), while if viewed as penalty, they had none. Federal_ Judicial Code,
§ 256, second, 28 U.S.C. (1940) § 371; Emerson v., Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc.,
173 Misc. 531, 174 Misc. 353, affirmed, 261 App. Div. 879 (1941), affirmed, 287
N.Y. 577, 38 N.E. (2d) 234 (1941); Hargraves v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Co.,
(D.C. Okla. 1941) 36 F. Supp. 233.
.
,
144 Overnight Motor•Transp. Co., Inc. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 62 S .Ct. 1216
(1942).
- 145 Cf. N.Y. Civil Practice Act (Cahill, 1937) § 480 ("••• any action •.. based
upon breach of performance of a contract ••."), construed in Pedersen v. J. F. Fitzgerald Const. Co., 293 N.Y. 126, 56 N".E. (2d) 77 (i944).
146 E.g., N.Y. Civil Practice Act (Cahill, 1937) § 48 (1) (6 years) rnd not id.,
§ 49 (3) (3 years), since the latter refers to actions upon a statutory penalty, the
former. to those upon a contract or statutory obligations. Walsh v. 515 Madison Ave.
Corp., (N.Y. S. Ct: 1943) 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 262. State limitation' statute held, applicable to contractual obligations: Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, (C.C.A. 6th,
1945) 151 F. (2d) 543. A good discussion of the cases collated there can be found
in Keen v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., (D.C. Iowa 1945) 58 F. Supp. 915.
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Nevertheless, awkward as the way of statutorily stereotyping contracts seems to be, it had its' raison d'etre. One need only remember
that not very long ago in Adkins v. Children's Hospital 147 prescription of terms and conditions for a contractual relationship was deemed
to be irreconcilable with the idea of a contract.148 For us, the fine distinction between terms prescribed for a contractual relationship of a
certain class and terms to be inserted in such a contract by the contractor
himself seems to be no more than gossamer. In either case, the parties
subject to the statute are still free to decide whether or not they would
enter into the relationship; and, on the other hand, if they enter their
bargaining is limited by the statutory command, whatever its mode
of expression.
It is interesting to note that where the state or its divisions acted as
employer, the courts, even prior to 1937, found no fault with a direct command of the terms to the benefit of which the employees were
entitled. A sovereign, of course, may burden itself as it pleases.149 On
the other hand, when the state acted as champion for the protection of
another's employees, the form in which the state exercised its protective
function was that of mere directions to the public contractors to write
specified terms into the contract. The latter method was apparently
µiought to satisfy the constitutional requirements for freedom of contract. Such important acts as the Davis-Bacon Act 150 and the WalshHealy Act 151 still cling to that method. Acts of similar pattern were
147
261 U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394 (1923), overruled in 1937 by West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937).
148
PouND, INTERPRETATION oF LEGAL H1sTORY 63 ( 1923): "Hence it seemed
to them [the judges] that the constitutional requirement of due process of law was
violated by legislative attempts to restore status and restrict the contractual power of
free men .•••" Cf. Frank, J. in Beidler & Bookmyer, Inc. v. Universal Ins. Co.,
(C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 134 F (2d) 828 at 829: "True, once upon a time---and not
so long ago--the word 'contract' cast a curious spell on legal thinking." Similar is
Judge Frank's criticism in the most recent case, Martin v. Campanaro, (C.C.A .. '2d,
1946) l 56 F. (2d) 127.
149
Glavey v. United States, 182 U.S. 595, 21 S. Ct. 891 (1901); Wright v.
State, 223 N.Y. 44, u9 N.E. 83 (1918); Matter of Flaherty v. Craig, 184 App. Div.
428, 171 N.Y.S. 624 (1918); 'Quayle v. City of New York, 253 App. Div. ·735
(1937); State ex rel. Rothrum v. Darby, 345 Mo. 1002, 137 S.W. (2d) 532 (1940);
Altenberg v. City of Superior, 228 Wis. 272, 280 N.W. 342 (1938).
150
46 Stat. L. 1494 (1931), as amended by 49 Stat. L. IOII (1935) and 54
Stat. L. 399 (1940), 40 U.S.C. (1940) § 276a ("every contract ••. to which United
States ••• is a party ••• [ concerning] construction of public buildings .•• shall contain
a provision ••.").
151
49 Stat. L. 2036 (1936), as amended 56 Stat. L. 277 (1942), 41 U.S.C.
(1940 and Supp. 1944) § 35 (contractors have to include certain stipulations and pro-
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enacted in many states. Some of them provided that terms, even though
not inserted into the contract, shall be deemed to be inserted anyway.152
It was that way of expressing the legislative objective which put at rest
the question of the effect which a failure to execute the contract as so
prescribed carried with it.153
There still, of course, remains the difficulty of determining whether
such statutes create direct rights of the employees against the contractor. Faithful to the axiom that there can be no contractual obligation
without a promise, the courts have given the Walsh-Healey Act, for
instance, a construction which barred a direct acti.on on the part of the
employee.154 The farthest step which the courts were prepared to take
was to read into the public contractor's contract an additional contract
for the benefit of the employee; this step was taken by some federal
courts with respect to the Davis-Bacon Act. 155
Let us assume, for a moment, that such a statute was intended to
create a direct action on the part of the employee.156 Still, the distinction must be made between the status of a party to the contract and
the status of a third pary beneficiary. A legal compulsion can be brought
to bear upon the former, but never upon the latter. Cannot the latter
renounce the benefit? Can anyone be compelled to accept benefits
against his will? 157 The question may be asked whether the oldfashi~ned requirement that those terms may be incorporated in the

'
hibitions concerning their employ of workers in the bids for federal government
con tracts) .
152
Recognized as constitutional in Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 24 S. Ct. 124
(1903) (concerning a Kansas labor statute for works to be performed by contractors
for the state) •
153
United States v. Morley Const. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 781 at
789. In this case arising under the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. (1940) § 276a, the
court denied the legality of any waiver on the part of the employees respecting the
benefits of the act, adding: "We do not say that if the contract had not incorporated
the statute, the laborers would have had the privilege at all.••."
lHSee Greenstein v. Pan American-Airways, Inc., 185 Misc. 429, 57 N.Y.S.
(2d) 178 (1945).
155
United States v. Morley Const. Co., (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 98 F. (2d) 781.
156
I CoNTRACTS RESTATEMENT, §§ 145 and 147.
157 Huston v. Washington Wood & Coal Co., 4 Wash. (2d) 449, 103 P. (2d)
1095 (1940). There the court, construing the rights of an employee under a collective bargaining contract as those of a third party beneficiary, held them, therefore, to
be "waivable." Consequently, for the vast majority of collective contracts, namely
those which fall within § 9(a) of the NLRA, the third-party-beneficiary-contract
construction has become untenable, at long last, with Order of R.R. Tel. v. Ry. Express
Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 64 S. Ct. 582 (1944), and J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
332, 64 S. Ct. 576 (1944).
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contract with the government has not led the courts to regard them
by contrast as no part of the contract with the employee, a result traceable to the disinclination to regard statutory prescriptions in themselves as part of the contract. To be sure, subsequent to the method of
the Fair Labor Standards Act directly prescribing an action to the employee, the use of the old method might imply the exclusion of an
employee action. ·
In any event, what the courts said about an employee's right of
action as a third party beneficiary presupposed the view of prescribed
terms as a basis for actions ex contractu. Most recently this was the
issue in Fata v. S. A. Healy Company. 158 New York labor law requires
the insertion in any contract on public works of a provision concerning
the payment of not less than the prevailing wage rate; a schedule of
wages, ascertained by the fiscal officer prior to the advertisements for
bids, has to be annexed to, and to form a part of, the specifications.159
The statute1 aside from criminal sanctions, provides for the enforcement of the wage obligation by the fiscal officer.160 The officer must, on
the verified complaint of any person interested, make an investigation
and determination.161 Without such precedent determination, the courts,
prior to the Fata case, would not have taken jurisdiction in an action
of an employee for the recovery of the wage balance. Consequently,
an employee was not authorized to claim back pay for a time which
antedated the filing of his complaint with the fiscal officer.162 The
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York dismissed the
action upon the tenet that "· .. where the provisions of the contract
relied upon are included pursuant to the command of the statute, no
such voluntary intention [i.e., to benefit a third party] can be inferred." 163
Said the New York Court of Appeals, reversing: " ... It cannot be
doubted that provisions requ_iring the contractor to pay such wages are
m 289 N.Y. 401, 46 N.E. (2d) 339 (1943).
169
N.Y. Lapor Law (McKinney, 1940) § 220(3).
160
Id., § 220 (5) (c) (that is, Industrial Commissioner of the State or Comptroller of the City, respectively).
161
Id., § 220 (7).
162
Matter of Carr v. Kern, 279 N.Y. 42, 17 N.E. (2d) 762 (1938); Olsen v.
Brooklyn Ash Removal Co., Inc., 268 N.Y. 693, 198 N.E. 561 (1935). Consequently, the fiscal officer, so it was held, has to limit his investigatio~ to the present
time and to the future, but may not extend it back to the antecedent period. Matter
of Simpson v. Taylor, 278 N.Y. 643; 16 N.E. (2d) 300 (1938), affirming 253
App. Div. 713 (1937).
168
263 App. Div. 725 at 726 (1941).
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also inserted in contract, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of
• the statute, for the benefit of the laborers, as well as for the benefit
of the public body which is a party to the contract." 164

IV
SUMMARY

A:. The law of contracts is not comprised exclusively of rules touching the formation of the contract and imposing prohibitions; for the
contents of a contract consist not of party-made stipulation~ alone, as
· the common-law theories assumed. There has developed a substantial
amount of optional law and beyond that there are terms and conditions imposed by law.
B~ As an outcome of the old theories, on the one hand, optional
law has been couched in a language derived from consent and intention,
called implied terms until quite recent legislation. 01_1 the other hand,
statutory, law affecting in varying degrees the contents of contractual
obligations which could not be bargained away by stipulations of the
parties was regarded as noncontractual in character. This accounts
also for the aversion of the English and American courts to the utilization of analogy as a suitable method for subsuming under a statute
situations similar to those embraced in the statutory words.
C. With the increased resort to legislation, doctrines reserving the
concept of contractual obliga'.tions to those which rest upon the free
choice of the parties lost their basis. Thus the door was opened for an
approach to the civil law classification of statutory rules, namely of
optionat terms and required terms both of which are regarded as parts
of the contract.
D. In either case, the classifications are of greatest practical importance for both the domestic law and the conflict of laws.
E. The manner in which legislation creates rules which fall within
the class of jus cogens varies with the subject matter and depends on
whether emphasis is placed on homogeneity or variability of the prescribed terms. Considerations of this kind will determine whether a
legislature may resort to standard forms, or to terms and conditions
established through an administrative process, or to schedules incor. porated ·by reference in statutes regulating the effect of collective bargaining contracts. The · first-mentioned terms are distinguished by
'

•

.

164

l

289 N.Y. 401 at 405, 46 N.E. (id) 339 (italics supplied).
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constancy and homogeneity. The last-~entioned ones vary with the
formation of new collective contracts.
F. The fact that terms are prescribed may affect their interpretation and make them more liable than are agreed terms to legislative
impairment.
G. With the decline of the sensitiveness against an approach which
does not deny contractual effects to obligati0ns imposed upon the contracting parties, it seems to be no longer necessary to use legislative
forms of disguise. Such a disguise was the direction which the legislature gave the contracting parties, to write the prescribed terms into
their contract. · The circuitous way, full of pitfalls, has now lost any
right to exist. The correct way is to fix the terms in the statute, and to
indicate whether or not they are subject to the control of the parties
to the contract. However, in some cases, as in the standard insurance
contracts, the complete expression in the contract of the statutory terms
may serve to advise the parties of their rights.

